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Advocates of the counterfactual approach to causal inference argue that race is not a cause,
and this despite the fact that it is commonly treated as such by scientists in many disciplines.
I object that their argument is unsound because two of its premises are false. I also sketch an
argument to the eect that racial discrimination cannot be explained unless one assumes race
to be a cause.
1 Introduction
Scientists in many disciplines (economics, epidemiology, etc.) routinely treat race as a cause.
Economists who study labor market discrimination, for instance, often build models involving race
as an independent variable and interpret estimates of the coecient attached to it as estimates
of the causal eect of race.1 This practice conicts with the view held by leading advocates of
the counterfactual approach to causal inference (henceforth `CFA') who argue that, since race is a
necessary property of individuals, one cannot coherently treat it as a cause.
Important issues hang on the outcome of this debate between practitioners and theorists of
causal inference. If race is not a cause, then the coecients attached to variables representing race
do not represent the causal eect of race. But then what, if anything, do they represent? And
if these coecients do not represent the causal eect of race, then is it legitimate to use data on
race to estimate them? Should studies that purport to measure the causal eect of race (e.g. on
earnings or on access to health care) be funded? And should social and health policies be based on
results from such studies?
After a brief introduction to the CFA (x2), I present the argument against race being a cause
(x3). I then raise objections against two of its premises (x4) and sketch a positive argument for
race being a cause (x5).
2 The counterfactual approach
The CFA, rst introduced by Rubin (1974), is the dominant approach to causal inference in statistics
and in many social and biomedical sciences. It has roots in the work of Fisher and Neyman on
agricultural experiments.
1See e.g. (Kahn and Sherer, 1988) for a classic example.
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When only one cause is considered, counterfactual causal models essentially have the following
components:
 A population of units i 2 U
 A binary causal exposure variable D taking value di = 1 when i is exposed to the cause (is
in the `treatment' state) and di = 0 when i is not (is in the `control' state).
 Two potential outcome variables Y 1 and Y 0, where y1i represents the value of the eect for i
when i is exposed to the cause and y0i , the value of the eect for i when i is not exposed to
the cause.




This causal eect is equal to the dierence between the value of the eect when i is exposed to
the cause and the value of the eect when i is not. Since a given unit cannot be both exposed to
the cause and not exposed to it at once, only one of y1i and y
0
i can be observed for any unit. If i
is exposed to the cause, the value of y1i is observable while the value of y
0
i is counterfactual: It is
the value the eect would have taken had i not been exposed to the cause; hence the name of the
approach. Because only one of y1i and y
0
i can be observed, i cannot be observed either. Holland
dubs this the \fundamental problem of causal inference" (1986, 947).
There are various solutions to this problem, both in experimental and in observational contexts.
These solutions provide techniques for estimating the ICE and other causal eects, or parameters,
one can build from it. My concern here is not with the problems that race might raise for the
application of these estimation techniques. It is, rather, with the problems that race allegedly
raises for the very denition of causal eects, and of the ICE in particular.
3 The argument against race being a cause
The argument developed by leading advocates of the CFA against race being a cause can be
reconstructed as follows:
1. Race is a necessary property of units.
2. If i is of race r, then it is impossible for i to have been of another race r0. (from 1)
3. Counterfactuals of the form `Had i been of race r0 instead of r, then. . . ' cannot be (non-
vacuously) true. (from 2)
4. The ICE of race is undened. (from 3 and the denition of ICE)
5. For all x, if x is a cause, then its ICE is dened.
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) Race is not a cause. (from 4 and 5).
Let me illustrate this argument. Assume that there are only two races, that D represents race,
and that di = 1 when i is White and di = 0 when i is Black. Leading advocates of the CFA, such
as Rubin and Holland, hold that race is a necessary property, \immutable characteristic" (Greiner
and Rubin, 2011), or \attribute" (Holland, 1986, 955) of units. To say that race is a necessary
property of units is to say that if di = 1 (resp. 0), then it could not have been the case that di = 0
(resp. 1). Because this is so, counterfactuals of the form `Had it been the case that di = 0 instead
of di = 1, then the value of Y
0 for i would have been y0i ' cannot be non-vacuously true when
di = 1 (and conversely when di = 0). In Holland's words, \attributes of units [e.g. race] are not the
types of variables that lend themselves to plausible states of counterfactuality." (2003, 14, emphasis
original)2 Because no such counterfactual can be non-vacuously true, however, the ICE of race is
undened, and this regardless of what eect the potential outcome variables Y 1 and Y 0 represent
(earnings, education, etc.).3 And since the ICE of race is undened, race is not a cause.
The consequences of this view are important. If race is not a cause then, as Greiner and
Rubin point out, \attempts to infer the causal eects of such traits [as race] are incoherent." (2011,
775) Holland goes further by claiming that, \Attributing cause to RACE is merely confusing and
unhelpful" and that, \Obscuring [the topics of discrimination and bias] with simplistic calculations
that do not attend to the proper role of RACE in a causal study helps no one." (2003, 24)
So, do the many scientists who treat race as a cause waste time and resources on incoherent
studies that only obscure important topics like racial discrimination? I do not believe so and raise
two objections to the argument against race being a cause.
4 Against the argument against race being a cause
4.1 Why believe premise 5?
According to premise 5 in the argument against race being a cause, having a well-dened ICE is a
necessary condition for being a cause. To believe this premise is to believe that every cause can be
handled by the CFA. There are good reasons to think, however, that some genuine causes cannot
be handled by the CFA.
Consider, for instance, the case of primary school performance: According to Holland himself,
scholastic achievement in primary school cannot be treated as a cause of the choice of secondary
school by the CFA because its ICE is undened (1986, 955).4 Assuming that Holland is correct in
his assessment, the right conclusion to draw here does not seem to be that scholastic achievement
2Holland adds: \Because I am a White person, it would be close to ridiculous to ask what would have happened
to me had I been Black." (2003, 14)
3The same point applies mutatis mutandis to other causal eects dened in the CFA, e.g. the average causal eect
dened over U as E[Y 1]  E[Y 0].
4Holland holds this view because he thinks that, \It is dicult to conceive of how scholastic achievement could
be a treatment in an experiment. . . " (1986, 955) and because, as a result, he thinks that scholastic achievement, like
race, does not lend itself to \plausible states of counterfactuality".
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is not a cause of school choice. This is so because there are very good reasons to think that how
well a student does in primary school has an eect on what secondary school she chooses to attend
(e.g. by determining what schools she is admitted to). The right conclusion to draw, rather, seems
to be that some genuine causes cannot be handled by the CFA, and so that having a well-dened
ICE is not necessary to be a cause.
This conclusion is bolstered by the existence of frameworks for causal inference, e.g. Ragin's
qualitative comparative analysis framework (1987), that do not rely on counterfactuals to dene
causal eects and which can thus treat variables whose ICE is undened as causes.
4.2 Why believe premise 1?
Why should one believe the claim that race is a necessary property, or attribute (in Holland's
terms), of units? How do advocates of the CFA justify this claim? Their justication derives
entirely from an application of what I will call `Holland's rule' (or `HR'). According to HR,
If the variable could be a treatment in an experiment (even one that might be impossible
to actually pull o due to ethical or practical issues), then the variable is [. . . ] correctly
called a causal variable. (Holland, 2003, 9, emphasis original)
It is important to note that, for Holland, attributes and causal variables form a partition of the
set of properties of a unit: If a property is not a causal variable, then it is an attribute. Holland
claims that race could not be a treatment in an experiment and, applying HR, he concludes that
it is not a causal variable but, rather, an attribute or necessary property (ibid.).5 Greiner and
Rubin agree and invoke \the impossibility of manipulating such traits [as race] in a way analogous
to administering a treatment in a randomized experiment" (2011, 775) as the main source of the
incoherence of studies purporting to estimate the causal eect of race.
There are, however, two problems with HR. First, it is the wrong rule for advocates of the CFA
to follow. According to the CFA, for the ICE of a factor D on i to be dened, there must be some
counterfactual state in which i is not exposed to D, assuming that i actually is exposed to D. In
other words, it must be possible for i not to have been exposed to D. But why think that the
possibility of such a state requires the possibility of an experiment resulting in it being the case
that i is not exposed to D? To hold this view is to hold the implausible view that it is possible
that p only if it is possible for there to be an experiment resulting in it being the case that p.
The right slogan for the CFA thus is not \No causation without [some hypothetical experimental]
manipulation" (Holland, 1986, 959) but, rather, `No causation without counterfactual states'. This
slogan is less catchy but more faithful to the way the CFA denes causal eects (e.g. the ICE).
One might object that HR was intended by Holland not as a strict rule but as a heuristic. It
is true that he prefaces his presentation of HR by saying that, \There is no cut-and-dried rule for
deciding which variables in a study are causal and which are not." (2003, 9) But note that, despite
5Note that Holland's argument is fallacious given the way he formulates HR: It denies the antecedent of HR and
infers the negation of its consequent. I am here adopting a charitable reading according to which being a treatment
in some possible experiment is necessary for a property to be a causal variable.
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this caveat, Holland does apply HR as a \cut-and-dried" rule, since he takes the supposed violation
of HR by race to be sucient to establish the conclusion that race is an attribute and so is not a
cause (op. cit., 10). It should also be noted that HR fares no better as a heuristic than it does as
a strict rule. I have claimed above that the possibility of an experiment resulting in i not being
exposed to D is not necessary for it to be possible that i is not exposed to D. If so, however, then
there is no reason to take the inconceivability of such an experiment to be a reliable guide to the
impossibility of a state in which i is not exposed to D.
The second issue with HR is that it is vague and that, as a result, it is unclear that it is
genuinely impossible for there to be an experiment in which race is the treatment. Consider the
following hypothetical (randomized) experiment in which race is the treatment: Assume that the
race ri of i is a function ri = f(bi; ei) of biological (bi) and environmental (including social and
cultural) factors (ei).
6 Imagine that values of bi and ei, and thus also of ri, are randomly assigned
to embryos 30 days after conception. The biological factors are assigned via genetic engineering
and the environmental factors are assigned by swapping embryos between mothers.
This experiment has not been carried out, is morally objectionable, and is (presumably) practi-
cally impossible given present science and technology. But, according to Holland himself, this does
not mean that this experiment is impossible. HR, however, does not give one any more guidance
regarding what it means for an experiment to be possible. I take it to be obvious that the exper-
iment is logically possible. This experiment also seems to be nomologically possible, i.e. it does
not seem that carrying it out would require the violation of any laws of nature. Is this experiment
also conceptually possible? Not if your favorite concept of race implies that values of bi and ei,
i.e. biological and environmental factors, are not enough to determine an individual's race. But if
your favorite concept of race has this implication, then why think that it is the right concept for
economists or epidemiologists studying race to be using?
So, there are good reasons to think that the experiment described above is logically, nomolog-
ically and conceptually possible. It thus seems that, pace Holland and Rubin, it is possible for
race to be a treatment in an experiment, even a randomized experiment, and so it does not seem
to be the case that race violates HR.7 What this means is that, even if HR was the right rule for
advocates of the CFA to follow, a view I have argued against, its application would nonetheless fail
to provide support for the claim that race is an attribute or a necessary property of units.
6You can set the relative weights of bi and ei however you like, depending on your view of race. Note, however,
that this experiment will not work if you think that, among the biological factors represented by bi, should be
`genealogical' properties of i (e.g. who i's biological parents are). Thus, if you think that races are biological groups
unied by genealogical relations (see e.g. Hardimon 2012), then you should think that what the experiment described
above randomly assigns is not genuinely race.
7An advocate of HR could object that the relevant notion of possibility is neither logical nor conceptual nor
nomological possibility. But then, what is the relevant notion of possibility?
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5 A positive argument for race being a cause: Explaining racial discrimination
Consider an imaginary society in which there are two exclusive and exhaustive racial groups, A
and B. Assume that there is a wage gap between As and Bs in this society: As receive wages
that are uniformly 30% lower than the wages received by Bs occupying equivalent jobs. Assume,
further, that all the units in the population, be they A or B, are perfectly homogeneous regarding
the causes of wages (other than, possibly, race), e.g. they received the same degree from the same
school, they have the same work experience, they have the same interpersonal skills, they work
equally hard, they have the same preferences regarding wages, etc. Assume, nally, that there is
only one employer in this society, and that this employer xes the wages of every worker.
What is the mechanism generating the wage gap in this society? What explains the fact that
some A worker, call her wA, receives wages 30% lower than those of a B worker, call her wB,
occupying an equivalent job? One straightforward answer is that wA receives wages 30% lower
than those of wB because she is an A and because the employer believes the work of As to be worth
30% less than that of Bs. In other words, the fact that wA is an A, together with the employer's
belief about the relative worth of the work of As, is the cause of her receiving wages 30% lower
than those of wB. And it seems intuitively correct to say that, had wA been a B instead of an A,
she would have received higher wages.
This commonsensical explanation is a causal explanation, since it purports to explain the wage
gap by citing its causes, and one of the causes it invokes is the race of wA and of other A workers.
This explanation thus is unavailable to those holding the view that race is not a cause. Indeed,
according to advocates of the CFA, counterfactuals about what the wages of wA would have been
like had she been a B instead of an A have impossible antecedents. But what might then explain
the wage gap between As and Bs? I examine the most prominent alternative explanation below.
According to the view defended by Greiner and Rubin (2011), among many others, races them-
selves play no causal role in generating the wage gap between As and Bs. What causally explains
this gap, rather, are perceptions of race. More precisely, what explains the fact that wA receives
wages 30% lower is not her race in combination with the employer's belief regarding the relative
worth of the work of As, but the perception of her race by the employer in combination with this
same belief. According to this view, then, coecients attached to variables representing race in
models should be understood as representing the causal eect of perceptions of race rather than the
causal eect of race itself. There are several problems with this alternative explanation, however.
I examine three below.
First, if the move to perceptions is warranted in the case of race, then why shouldn't it be
warranted for other properties of units as well? Why not think that, rather than work experience
(or education, or. . . ), it is the perception of work experience (or education, or. . . ) that is causally
relevant to an individual's wages, for instance? The move from race to perceptions of race seems
rather ad hoc and, in the case of Greiner and Rubin at least, is largely motivated by the assump-
tion that race cannot be a cause according to the CFA, an assumption which, I argued in x4, is
unwarranted.
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Second, in the imaginary society I described, it is easy enough to determine who's perception
it is that is causally relevant to explaining the wage gap, since there is only one employer. But
what if there were many employers, and what if the wages of As were on average, rather than
uniformly, 30% lower than those of Bs? Who's perception would then be causally relevant? The
collective perception of all the employers? Or the collective perception of only those employers who
believe the work of As to be worth less than that of Bs? If one is to appeal to perceptions of race
to explain any real wage gap between racial groups, then one needs answers to these questions.
Greiner and Rubin themselves point out the diculty in answering these questions as one limitation
of this approach (ibid., 783-784). And the problem is more severe even when one considers studies
of the eect of race on education or access to health care: What is the proper interpretation in
terms of perceptions of race of the causal eects estimated by these studies? The move from race
to perceptions of race thus raises as many questions as it answers.
Third, what is it that causes the employer in the imaginary society I described to perceive A
workers, e.g. wA, to be As? If race is not a cause, then what causes the employer to perceive wA
to be an A cannot be the fact that she is an A, i.e. it cannot be her race. The most plausible
alternative here seems to be to claim that what causes the employer to perceive wA to be an A is
the instantiation by wA of a set of features F the presence of which is strongly correlated with,
but does not constitute, being a A. Consider the case in which F : fskin color Sg. If the employer
perceives wA to be an A solely on the basis of her skin color and then proceeds to give her wages
30% lower than Bs in equivalent job on the basis of this perception, however, then is this case
properly described as a case of racial discrimination? Or is it a case of discrimination on the basis
of skin color?
Insofar as the employer equates race and skin color when, by assumption, they are not identical,
it seems more appropriate to describe this case as one of discrimination on the basis of skin color
than as one of genuinely racial discrimination. Consider the fact that, if the correlation between
being an A and being of skin color S is less than perfect, then the employer will discriminate against
some non-As and fail to discriminate against some As. In other words, the line between workers that
are discriminated against and workers that are not will cut across racial groups to follow the line
between skin colors. The view that this case is not one of racial discrimination is further supported
by standard denitions of `racial discrimination', e.g. the denition formulated by a panel of the US
National Research Council and which equates racial discrimination with \dierential treatment on
the basis of race that disadvantages a racial group. . . " (Blank et al., 2004, 39, emphasis original)
So, if perceptions of race are not caused by race but, rather, by features the instantiation of
which is merely correlated with race, then it is not clear that discrimination on the basis of these
perceptions is properly described as racial discrimination.8 In other words, it is doubtful that the
alternative developed by Greiner and Rubin can explain cases of genuinely racial discrimination
without assuming race to be a cause.
The alternative explanation developed by Greiner and Rubin thus does not seem as satisfactory
8And so it is not clear that these perceptions are properly called `perceptions of race' in the rst place.
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as the commonsensical explanation presented above and which assumes race to be a cause. Of
course, Greiner and Rubin's explanation is not the only possible alternative explanation. But it
is by far the most prominent in the literature. That it faces signicant diculties thus provides
some support for the claim that one must assume race to be a cause in order to explain racial
discrimination.
6 Conclusion
I have defended the view that the argument developed by advocates of the CFA against race being
a cause is unsound because two of its premises are false. And I have sketched a positive argument to
the eect that race must be assumed to be a cause in order to explain a phenomenon such as racial
discrimination. I have thus advanced reasons to doubt Greiner and Rubin's claim that attempts to
infer the causal eect of race on, e.g., wages are \incoherent" (2011, 775).
I have said little up to now about debates in the philosophy of race. If the arguments developed
above are sound, then it seems that philosophers of race should ensure that, whatever concept of
race they think should be used by scientists studying the role of race, their account of this concept
implies that race can be a cause.
The debate over the causal status of race examined in this paper also gives a useful example
of a case in which philosophers of science can, and should, contribute to clarifying the debate and
critically examine the assumption made by the scientists involved. This is what I have tried to do
above.
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